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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court arises under sections 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) of 
the Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE #1: Did Judge Peuler properly rule that pursuant to Utah's 
Recording Act, Metro West is the rightful owner of the property at issue because 
Metro West purchased the property in good faith and for valuable consideration and 
properly recorded its interest in the Utah County Recorder's Office nearly a decade 
before Salt Lake County recorded its purported interest? 
ISSUE #2: Is Metro West the rightful owner of the property at issue on the 
alternative ground of adverse possession where Metro West paid all taxes on the 
property and possessed and openly and exclusively used the property for a 
continuous period in excess of seven years? 
A trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Rawson v. Conover. 20 P.2d 876 (Utah 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1989, Metro West Ready Mix, Inc. ("Metro West"), through its 
predecessor in interest, paid valuable consideration to purchase a parcel of real 
property located entirely in Utah County on the west side of 1-15 near the point of 
the mountain. The property's northern border is the Utah County/Salt Lake County 
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line and its western border is the Rio Grande Railroad. The remainder of the 
property is bordered by Metro West's gravel pit operation. Immediately after it 
purchased the property in 1989, Metro West recorded its deed in the Utah County 
Recorder's Office. From that time forward, Metro West paid all taxes assessed on 
the property, and continually and openly used the property as part of its gravel pit 
operation. This property has been referred to in this case as "Parcel G" and this 
case is about the ownership of Parcel G. 
In 1999, Salt Lake County (the "County") filed this lawsuit, claiming that it 
owned Parcel G pursuant to an 1878 deed. The County failed to record its 
purported deed to Parcel G in the Utah County Recorder's Office until 1998, more 
than nine years after Metro West recorded its deed and over 120 years after the 
County claims it obtained the deed. Until 1998, there was no indication on the 
property or in the Utah County Recorder's Office that the County had any 
ownership interest in Parcel G. Metro West had the only properly recorded deed to 
Parcel G; it alone paid all taxes assessed on Parcel G; and it openly, continuously 
and exclusively used Parcel G as part of its gravel pit operation for nearly a decade. 
In response to the County's lawsuit, Metro West filed a motion for summary 
judgment asserting that it was the rightful owner of Parcel G pursuant to Utah's 
Recording Act and, alternatively, on the basis of adverse possession. On February 
26,2001, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler granted Metro West's Motion pursuant to 
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the Recording Act and therefore did not reach the issue of adverse possession. [R. 
at296-97.] 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Metro West set forth several 
numbered paragraphs of undisputed fact. [R. at 83-86.] The County did not dispute 
any of Metro West's facts as required by Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration and the facts were therefor "deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment." Id. The same facts are set forth herein, in relevant 
part, with citations to the record. 
1. Metro West, through its predecessor in interest, Lamona Farms, 
purchased Parcel G from Dahrl and Roena Tingey on April 14,1989 for 
approximately $25,000 and then promptly recorded its deed to parcel G in the Utah 
County Recorder's Office. [R. at 97-100,106, 127.] Parcel G is located entirely in 
Utah County. [R. at 127.] 
2. During negotiations to purchase Parcel G, the Tingeys represented to 
the owners of Lamona Farms, Dr. Paul Richards and Dr. David Nelson, that the 
Tingey family had owned Parcel G since the turn of the century. [R. at 102,104-
05.] 
3. Lamona Farms purchased and recorded its interest in Parcel G with the 
assistance of a title company. The title company reviewed Parcel G and reported to 
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Lamona Farms that there were no conflicts with the Tingey's ownership of Parcel 
G. [R. at 102-03.] Dr. Richards and Dr. Nelson also personally reviewed records 
obtained from the Utah County Recorder's Office and determined that there were 
no conflicts with respect to the Tingey's representations regarding their 
longstanding ownership of Parcel G. [R. at 100-01.] 
4. In April 1991, all of the property Lamona Farms had acquired at the 
point of the mountain, including Parcel G, was transferred by deed from Lamona 
Farms to Monterra Rock Products, Inc. [R. at 106, 128-30.] In 1993, Monterra 
Rock merged into Metro West. [R. at 107-08.] Neither Lamona Farms, Monterra 
Rock, nor Metro West had any knowledge whatsoever of the County's claimed 
ownership interest in Parcel G prior to June 1998. [R. at 119-20.] 
5. The County did not record its deed to Parcel G in the Utah County 
Recorder's Office until June 1998, more than 120 years after it purportedly acquired 
the property. [R. at 131,133, 138-40.] 
6. Prior to the County's recording of its purported deed in June 1998, 
there was no indication of any kind in the Utah County Recorder's Office that the 
County claimed any ownership interest in Parcel G. [R. at 141-43.] 
7. Between 1990 and 1998, the County did not perform any activity on 
Parcel G. The County has never posted any sign or given any other indication on 
Parcel G evidencing its purported ownership of the property. [R. at 136-37.] In 
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fact, the County is unaware of whether any of its employees or agents ever set foot 
on Parcel G at anytime between 1990 and June 1998. [R. at 134-35.] 
8. From the time it acquired Parcel G in 1989, Metro West (and its 
predecessors in interest), exclusively, continuously and openly used the property as 
part of Metro West's gravel pit operation. Metro West began excavating and 
drilling holes on Parcel G in 1990 and conducting sampling testing of the 
underground materials. To perform this work, Metro West bulldozed rough roads 
into the property, enlarged existing roads, and repeatedly took heavy drilling and 
excavating equipment onto the property. This and other activity on Parcel G 
occurred regularly over the next several years. [R. at 108-13, 116-18,121-26.] 
9. At the point of the mountain where Parcel G is located, there are 
numerous operating gravel pits. Parcel G is substantially bordered by the remainder 
of Metro West's gravel pit and is generally surrounded by other gravel mining 
operations. At all relevant times, the only vehicle access to parcel G was through 
Metro West's gravel pit operation where Metro West had numerous signs indicating 
its ownership of the gravel pit. [R. at 145-47.] 
10. Metro West and its predecessors in interest paid all taxes assessed on 
Parcel G each year from 1990 through 1999. [R. at 114-15,145-57.] 
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RESPONSE TO THE COUNTY'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In its fact statement, the County infers that the boundary line between Utah 
County and Salt Lake County was not established until after the County acquired 
its purported interest in Parcel G and that this somehow caused the County's 
failure to record its deed in the Utah County Recorder's Office. [Appellant's Brief 
at 4-5.] This is false. At all relevant times, Parcel G has been located entirely in 
Utah County. The boundary line between Utah County and Salt Lake County was 
established, at the latest, in 1876 and has remained the same through today. 
Chapter III, Section 10 of the Compiled Laws of the Territory of Utah, dated 1876, 
provides a detailed description of the county boundaries existing at that time, and 
reads, in relevant part, as follows: 
(152.) Sec. 10. All that portion of the Territory bounded south by 
Juab and Sanpete Counties, west by the summit of the range between 
Cedar and Rush Valleys, north by the summit of the cross range 
between the Oquirrh and Wasatch Mountains . . . is hereby made 
and named Utah County, with County Seat at Provo. 
[R. at 275-77, emphasis added.] 
Section 17-50-229 of the Utah Code, dated 2000, describes the current 
"geographic boundaries of Utah County", and provides that the boundary between 
Utah County and Salt Lake County is "the point of intersection of the Wasatch 
Range with the summit of the range crossing from the Wasatch to the Oquirrh 
Mountains" [R. at278-79, emphasis added.] 
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As these statutes unambiguously provide, the northern border of Utah 
County, which is the boundary between Utah County and Salt Lake County, has 
remained unchanged since 1876. At all relevant times, Parcel G has been located 
in Utah County and it is undisputed that the County did not file its purported 
interest in Parcel G in the Utah County Recorder's Office until 1998. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Judge Peuler correctly ruled that Metro West is the rightful owner of Parcel 
G. Metro West purchased Parcel G in good faith and for fair market value; it duly 
recorded its deed with the Utah County Recorder's Office; it paid all taxes assessed 
on Parcel G; and it used the property openly and continuously as part of its gravel 
pit operations. The County, on the other hand, failed to record its purported deed to 
Parcel G in the Utah County Recorder's Office until nearly nine years after Metro 
West recorded its deed and over 120 years after the County purportedly obtained 
title to Parcel G. From 1989 to 1998, the County failed to use the property in any 
manner; failed to post any notice or indication of its purported ownership on the 
property, and failed to give Metro West any indication whatsoever that the County 
claimed ownership of Parcel G. 
Utah is a race-notice state and under well-settled Utah law, the burden is on a 
property owner to record its deed in the county in which the property is located. If 
another party subsequently purchases the property for valuable consideration and 
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without notice of any competing interest and records its deed prior to the first party 
recording its deed, Utah law plainly holds that the first party's deed is void as to the 
subsequent purchaser and the property belongs to the subsequent purchaser. That is 
precisely what occurred in this case. As Judge Peuler found, Metro West purchased 
Parcel G in good faith, for valuable consideration and without knowledge of the 
County's purported ownership interest and then recorded its deed in the Utah 
County Recorder's Office nearly a decade before the County recorded its purported 
deed. Under Utah law, Metro West is the owner of Parcel G. 
Even if this Court were to hold that Utah's Recording Act somehow did not 
apply in this case, it should nevertheless uphold Judge Peuler's grant of summary 
judgment in Metro West's favor on the alternative ground that Metro West is the 
rightful owner of Parcel G pursuant to the doctrine of adverse possession. The 
parties fully briefed and argued this issue to the Trial Court. Metro West 
purchased Parcel G nearly ten years prior to receiving any notice of the County's 
purported interest. Upon purchase, Metro West duly recorded its deed in the Utah 
County Recorder's Office, paid all assessed taxes on Parcel G, and openly used 
Parcel G as a part of its ongoing gravel pit operation. Because the statutory 
elements of adverse possession are met in this case, Metro West is the owner of 
Parcel G. 
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The recording requirements and the doctrine of adverse possession are well 
established in Utah. The County, as a substantial property owner, an assessor of 
property taxes, and an entity specifically charged with preserving, cataloging, and 
controlling documents reflecting property rights and ownership in the state of 
Utah, is acutely aware of these statutes and of its obligation to properly record its 
own property. In this case, the County failed for over 120 years to properly record 
its purported ownership of Parcel G. The County should not be rewarded for its 
failure by obtaining a significant and entirely serendipitous windfall from the 
efforts of Metro West in mining and cultivating Parcel G over the past decade. 
Likewise, Metro West should not be harshly and inequitably penalized because of 
the County's admitted failure to comply with clear, statutory recording 
requirements. 
Judge Peuler properly granted summary judgment in Metro West's favor and 
this Court should uphold that ruling on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. JUDGE PEULER PROPERLY HELD THAT UTAH'S RECORDING 
ACT APPLIES IN THIS CASE. 
Utah's Recording Act is found in Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-3-103, 
and reads, in relevant part, as follows: 
Effect of Failure to Record. 
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Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as 
against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any 
portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good 
faith and for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the purpose of Utah's 
Recording Act is to "protect the purchaser's interest" against the asserted but 
unrecorded interest of a third party. Horman v. Clark. 744 P.2d 1014,1016 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1987) (internal citations omitted); see also Johnson v. Higlev. 989 P.2d 
61, 70 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999) ("[t]he recording statute's purpose is to provide a 
method by which a transferee can protect himself from intervening claimants") 
(internal quotations omitted). Thus, "an innocent purchaser, having no notice of 
liens or adverse claims not disclosed by the records in the manner prescribed by 
the statute, will hold land as against such claims and liens." Johnson. 989 P.2d at 
70 (citing 66 Am. Jur.2d Records and Recording Laws § 48 (1973)). 
In this case, the Trial Court applied Utah's Recording Act and concluded, 
based on the Recording Act's plain language and the undisputed facts that Metro 
West was the rightful owner of Parcel G. [R. at 296-97.] The County now claims 
that Utah's Recording Act should not apply in this case 1) because Metro West did 
not have what the County refers to as "good chain of title" to Parcel G and 2) 
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because Metro West acquired Parcel G by quitclaim deed. As set forth below, the 
County is incorrect and its arguments are not supported by law or fact. Utah's 
Recording Act applies in this case and this Court should uphold the Trial Court's 
grant of summary judgment in Metro West's favor. 
A. Utah's Recording Act Does Not Have a "Good Chain of Title" 
Requirement. 
The County alleges that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
in Metro West's favor because Metro West failed to establish "good chain of title" 
to Parcel G. [Appellant's Brief at 12-13.] In support of this argument, the County 
asserts, with no citation whatsoever to the language of Utah's Recording Act or 
case law, that the Recording Act only protects a purchaser of land if the purchaser 
can establish a direct chain of title to the land. In essence, the County claims that 
the Recording Act only applies when both parties claiming title to a parcel of land 
can each establish "good chain of title" to that same land. The County's argument 
is nonsensical. It would be impossible, as the County suggests, for two parties to 
have competing, mutually exclusive claims to the same property yet both possess 
"good chain of title." 
Moreover, as set forth below, the County's argument simply misinterprets 
the purpose and focus of Utah's Recording Act. Rather than focus on the grantor's 
title or lack thereof as the County seemingly claims, the purpose of the Recording 
Act is to protect bona fide purchasers of real property who purchase in "good 
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faith" and for "valuable consideration." Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-3-103. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Pender v. Bird, 224 P.2d 1057, 1069 (Utah 1950), 
explicitly stated that the purpose of the Recording Act "is to protect the man who 
honestly believes he is acquiring a good title and who invests some substantial sum 
in reliance on that belief." And as this Court held in Horman v. Clark. 744 P.2d 
1014,1016 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987), Utah's Recording Act was enacted to protect a 
good faith purchaser who pays valuable consideration for a property who has no 
notice of any defects in his grantor's title including any competing interests.1 
Although Utah Courts have not addressed a case with facts similar to the 
present case, courts from jurisdictions with similar recording acts have addressed 
such cases and have clearly rejected the argument the County is attempting to 
make in this case. 
In Roberts v. Purslev, 718 A.2d 837 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998), the Pursleys 
brought an ejectment action against the Roberts. At trial, the Pursleys established 
their "good chain of title" to the property, dating back to the original 1854 warrant. 
Id. at 840. The Roberts, however, could not establish their title prior to 1901, due 
1
 Comment 1 to Connecticut's Recording Act, which is similar to Utah's Recording 
Act, makes clear that the focus should not be on the grantor's actual title but rather 
on the title that the purchaser believes in good faith he is receiving from the 
grantor: "[T]he rights acquired by a bona fide purchaser or judgment lien creditor, 
without notice of an unrecorded interest, are not determined by the actual title of 
the grantor, but rather by his apparent title." Comment 1, Connecticut's Standards 
of Title, Standard 2.7. 
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to an ineffective conveyance that had occurred at that time. Id The trial court 
found that the Roberts could not, therefore, establish "good chain of title." 
The trial court then focused on when the parties had recorded their deeds to 
the property. The party that sold the property to the Roberts had duly recorded its 
deed to the property in 1964. The Pursley's predecessors in interest, however, did 
not record any interest in the property until 1967, nearly 113 years after the 
original warrant and 3 years after the Roberts' predecessor-in-interest had recorded 
its deed. The trial court found, pursuant to Pennsylvania's recording statute and 
despite its finding that the Roberts failed to prove "their predecessors ever acquired 
title to the [property]," that because the Roberts' predecessor-in-interest recorded 
its interest in the property prior to the Pursleys' predecessors-in-interest recording 
its interest, the Roberts held valid title to the property. See id. 
On Appeal, the Pursleys argued, similar to the County's argument in this 
case, that Pennsylvania's recording act should not apply because the Roberts' 
grantor did not possess legal title. Id at 841. The Pennsylvania Superior Court 
disagreed. The court initially found that "[t]he recording statute was intended to 
protect bona fide purchasers who give value for land" and in order to qualify as a 
bona fide purchaser under the act, "the subsequent buyer must be without notice of 
a prior equitable interest." Id. The Court then flatly rejected the Pursleys' 
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argument that the recording act does not apply where a party's grantor did not hold 
legal title to the property in dispute. The Court held: 
If "legal title," within the [Pursleys'] definition, were required for a 
subsequent purchaser to qualify as a bona fide purchaser, the 
recording statute would not further its intended goals. For instance, in 
the typical recording statute situation, a grantor sells land to a grantee 
who does not record the deed; then, a subsequent buyer purchases the 
same land from the same grantor as the original grantee and this 
subsequent grantee records his deed before the first grantee. This 
subsequent grantee does not have "legal title" within the [Pursleys'] 
definition because at the time the land was sold to him, the grantor did 
not have legal title to give such right. Yet, notwithstanding the fact 
that he does not have "legal title," he is a bona fide purchaser if at the 
time of the sale he was without notice of an adverse interest and value 
was given for the purchase of the land. 
Id. The Court concluded that acceptance of the Pursleys' argument that a 
requirement of "legal title" should be imposed on the definition of a bona fide 
purchaser "would nearly render the recording statute useless." Id The Court held 
that the recording act did apply and that the Roberts held superior title to the 
property over the Pursleys. 
Likewise, in Alexander v. O'Neih 267 P.2d 730 (Ariz. 1954), the Arizona 
Supreme Court found that an individual who, in good faith and for valuable 
consideration, purchases land is entitled to the protection of a recording statute 
despite the fact that the purchaser receives a quitclaim deed from a grantor who did 
not have "good chain of title" to the land. In Alexander, a property owner, Solly, 
deeded a parcel of property to Alexander in 1933. Alexander did not record his 
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warranty deed to the property until nearly fifteen years later in 1948. In 1944, 
Solly died naming his wife as the sole beneficiary of his will. Shortly after Solly's 
death, his wife conveyed the same piece of property to a man named O'Neil by 
quitclaim deed. O'Neil recorded his quitclaim deed with the proper county 
recorder in 1946 - approximately two years prior to the time Alexander recorded 
his deed to the same property in 1948. In January 1948, O'Neil conveyed a portion 
of the property to the Northingtons by quitclaim deed. In 1949, Alexander brought 
a quiet title action against O'Neil and the Northingtons. 
The Court first affirmed judgment for the Northingtons, stating the 
following: 
Whether their grantor O'Neil was or was not a purchaser for value is 
not material to their rights so long as they had no notice of defects in 
their grantor's title, and did give value for the conveyance, which was 
made to them prior to the recordation of the 1933 Solly-Alexander 
deed. Furthermore, the fact that their deed from O'Neil was quitclaim 
in form in nowise precludes them from asserting that they were bona 
fide purchasers for a valuable consideration in good faith. 
Id. at 733. Although the court never found that the Northingtons had "good chain 
of title" to the property, the court held for the Northingtons pursuant to the 
recording act because the Northingtons purchased the property in good faith and 
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for valuable considerations and Alexander, who arguably held good chain of title, 
had failed to properly record his interest. Id at 734-35.2 
The same analysis applies in the present case. It is undisputed that Metro 
West purchased Parcel G in 1989 from the Tingeys for valuable consideration and 
without notice of any defects in the Tingey's title and immediately thereafter 
recorded its deed in the Utah County Recorder's Office. [R. at 127.] The County 
did not properly record its deed to Parcel G until nearly a decade later. [R. at 131, 
133, 138-40.] The County has not, and cannot, dispute that Metro West had no 
notice whatsoever regarding the County's purported interest in the property or that 
the Tingey's apparent title to Parcel G was anything other than what the Tingeys 
represented to Metro West. [R. at 102-05,136-37,141-43.] As Judge Peuler 
correctly ruled, as a bona fide purchaser of Parcel G, Metro West is entitled to the 
protection of the Recording Act. 
B. The Fact that Metro West Acquired Parcel G by Quitclaim Deed 
Has No Bearing On the Application of Utah's Recording Act. 
The County next claims that Utah's Recording Act should not apply in this 
case because Metro West acquired Parcel G by quitclaim deed. The County is 
again incorrect. A grantee under a quitclaim deed is a bona fide purchaser and is 
entitled to the full protection of the recording laws. Indeed, it is well-settled that 
2
 The Arizona Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of whether 
O'Neil paid valuable consideration for the quitclaim deed he received from Mrs. 
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[w]hile the courts have expressed themselves to the effect that a 
quitclaim deed passes no more than the grantor's present interest, this 
expression has been used to state a general truth, and not as a 
construction of the Recording Acts, and so far as concerns the rights 
of a grantee under a quitclaim deed by virtue of the Recording Acts 
the tendency of modern decisions is uniformly in favor of the rule 
[that a holder of a quitclaim deed is entitled to the same protection as 
one under a warranty deed.] 
Aiken v. Lane. 92 P.2d 628, 631 (Mont. 1939) citing 23 R.C.L. 242; see also 
Alexander. 267 P.2d at 733 ("the fact that [defendant's deed] was quitclaim in 
form in nowise precludes them from asserting that they were bona fide purchasers 
for a valuable consideration in good faith"); Virginia Highland Civic Assoc, v. 
Paces Properties. Inc.. 550 S.E.2d 128,130 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) ("a purchaser who 
takes a quitclaim deed without notice and for value is entitled to the protection 
which the law affords a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice"); 
Williams v. McCann. 385 P.2d 788, 791 (Okla. 1963) ("a purchaser under a 
quitclaim deed is a bona fide one"); 11 Thompson on Real Property 92.15(c)(3) 
(David A. Thomas ed., 1994) ("The prevailing view . . . is that conveyance by 
quitclaim deed does not disqualify the grantee from recording act protection."). 
The fact that Metro West purchased Parcel G by quitclaim deed has no 
bearing on whether Metro West purchased Parcel G in good faith. It is undisputed 
that Metro West had no knowledge whatsoever of the County's purported but 
unrecorded interest in Parcel G. The Tingeys represented to Metro West's 
Solly in 1944. 
17 
predecessor in interest that the Tingey family had continually owned and used 
Parcel G for more than a century. [R. at 102, 104-05.] Metro West's predecessor 
in interest, with the assistance of a title company, could find nothing in the Utah 
County records to conflict with the Tingeys' representations. [R. at 100-03.] 
Indeed, the County admits in prior briefing in this case that prior to 1998, Metro 
West "would not have found any record connecting the County to Parcel G in Utah 
County." [R. at 179.] 
Judge Peuler correctly applied Utah's Recording Act and correctly ruled that 
Metro West was the rightful owner of Parcel G. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT METRO WEST 
PURCHASED PARCEL G IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHOUT 
NOTICE OF THE COUNTY'S UNRECORDED INTEREST. 
The County additionally argues that even if the Recording Act applies to the 
facts of this case, there are disputed issues of material fact which preclude 
summary judgment regarding whether Metro West purchased Parcel G in good 
faith and without notice of the County's purported but unrecorded interest in Parcel 
G. The County is again incorrect. 
As an initial matter and as Judge Peuler found, there are no material disputes 
of fact in this case. In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Metro West 
set forth several numbered paragraphs of undisputed fact. [R. at 83-86.] The 
County did not dispute any of Metro West's facts as required by Rule 4-501(2)(B) 
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of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and the facts were therefor "deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment." Id. Thus, it is undisputed that 
Metro West purchased Parcel G for valuable consideration and without notice of 
the County's purported ownership interest. [R. at 100-03,106.] It is further 
undisputed that Metro West did not know, based on its inspection of Parcel G and 
its inspection of the records in the Utah County Recorder's Office, that the County 
had any purported ownership interest in Parcel G. [R. at 100-03,119-20,136-37.] 
Finally, it is undisputed that no amount of inspection or investigation of Parcel G 
itself or of the records at the Utah County Recorder's Office could have provided 
any such notice to Metro West because there simply was no notice of any kind on 
Parcel G or in the Utah County Recorder's Office of the County's purported 
ownership. [R. at 141-43.] 
Despite these undisputed facts, the County claims that Metro West should 
somehow have been on inquiry notice of the County's unrecorded interest in Parcel 
G, and that Metro West should be penalized because it did not somehow discover 
the County's complete failure for over a century to properly record its deed. The 
County's claim is not supported law or fact. 
In Patel v. Rupp, 195 B.R. 779 (D.Utah 1996), the District Court of Utah, in 
a case involving Utah's Recording Act, held that the doctrine of inquiry notice 
under Utah law involves a two-step analysis: 
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First, the court must determine whether the purchaser is in possession 
of facts, or whether inspection of the property would have brought to 
the purchaser's attention activity on the property, which would have 
reasonably alerted the purchaser to potential claims of any party other 
than the grantor or record title holder. If the purchaser has such facts, 
or if there is activity on the property reasonably alerting the purchaser 
to adverse claims, the purchaser is placed on inquiry notice; and, 
under the second step, the purchaser is charged with all knowledge 
that a reasonable due diligence investigation would have revealed. A 
purchaser's duty to investigate arises only when the purchaser is 
placed on inquiry notice under the first prong of the analysis. 
Id. at 783-84. Accordingly, "[u]nless there is activity apparent upon inspection 
'which would have reasonably alerted' a purchaser of [any adverse claim to the 
property], no inquiry need by made." Granada, Inc. v. Cinnamon Ridge. Ltd., 92 
B.R. 501, 506 (D.Utah 1988) (applying Utah's doctrine of inquiry notice); see also 
Johnson v. Bell. 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983) (holding that no "further 
investigation" is required where there is no "evidence that there was any activity 
on the property at [the time of the conveyance] which would have reasonably 
alerted" a party to any potentially adverse claims). 
As stated, it is undisputed that at the time Metro West purchased Parcel G 
from the Tingeys there was no activity on Parcel G that was in any way adverse to 
the Tingey's representations regarding their family's longstanding ownership of 
Parcel G as grazing land for livestock. [R. at 102,104-05,134-37.] Because there 
was no activity on Parcel G adverse to the Tingeys' claim and certainly no 
evidence whatsoever of the County's purported interest, Metro West was not 
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placed on inquiry notice and had no duty to further investigate the Tingeys' 
representations. "[A] duty to inquire is not a duty to disbelieve, aggressively 
investigate, and set straight." Diversified Equities. Inc. v. American Savings & 
Loan Assoc, 739 P.2d 1133,1137 n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
It is also undisputed that when Metro West purchased Parcel G in 1987, 
there were no records in Utah County connecting Parcel G to the County. [R. at 
141-43.] The County did not record its interest in Parcel G until 1998. The 
County argues, however, that Metro West had a duty to inquire beyond the Utah 
County records and search the records of Salt Lake County or the Bureau of Land 
Management to determine if there were any interests in Parcel G adverse to the 
Tingeys. The law imposes no such duty on Metro West. 
Section 57-3-101, of Utah's Recording Act specifically states that transfers 
of real property must be "recorded in the office of the recorder of the county 
where the property is located." (emphasis added). To that end, courts have 
repeatedly held that recording a deed in the wrong county imparts no notice to a 
subsequent purchaser. See, e^ g., Stringer v. Young. 28 U.S. 320 (1830) (holding 
that recording a deed in a "wrong county" is "fatal"); Honaker Lumber Co.. Inc. v. 
Kiser. 113 S.E.718,722 (Va. 1922) (holding that where a deed was recorded in the 
wrong county, a subsequent purchaser for value had no notice and "held legal title 
to the land"); Havs v. Pumphrev. 125 S.W. 1109, 1111 (Mo. 1910) ("the record of 
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a deed only imparts notice to subsequent purchasers when the deed is recorded in 
the county where the land is situate"). 
The County argues that because the Utah County records purportedly do not 
indicate that the Tingeys held clear title to Parcel G (despite the fact that there is no 
evidence in the Utah County records of any party holding any claim to Parcel G 
adverse to the Tingeys), Metro West was on inquiry notice to look beyond the Utah 
County records to other sources in an attempt to somehow find the County's 
mistake. This, again, is not the law. 
In its brief, the County, in hindsight, nit-picks at things it apparently believes 
Metro West could have done to somehow discover the County's mistake and then 
claims that Metro West is not a good faith purchaser because it did not do these 
things. For example, the County claims that Metro West was not a good faith 
purchaser because it did not retain a lawyer to assist in its purchase of Parcel G. 
[Appellant's Brief at 18.] While we as lawyers may believe we are indispensable 
in every business deal, we are not. Parties may still enter into a business deal 
without the aid of an attorney and doing so does not indicate bad faith or lack of 
diligence. The County also claims that Metro West did not obtain the aid of a 
professional title company in purchasing Parcel G. [Id.] This is simply false. It is 
undisputed that Metro West purchased Parcel G with the assistance of a title 
company and the title company conducted a review of the records and reported no 
conflicts with the Tingey's representations and certainly reported no indication of 
any ownership interest by the County. [R. at 102-03.] Indeed, the County has 
admitted that prior to 1998, Metro West "would not have found any record 
connecting the County to Parcel G in Utah County." [R. at 179.] The County's 
attempt to pass the blame to Metro West through its after-the-fact quibbling about 
what Metro West did or did not do is misplaced where the undisputed facts make 
clear that there was no indication whatsoever of the County's purported ownership 
interest either on the property itself or in the Utah County Recorder's Office at the 
time Metro West purchased Parcel G. If the County had simply followed Utah law 
and recorded its purported interest, Metro West would have been put on notice and 
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In First American Title Insurance Co. v. J.B. Ranch, 966 P.2d 834 (19981 
the defendant argued that the plaintiff should have been on inquiry notice of 
potentially adverse claims because although there was no record in the county 
recorder's office, public maps filed with the county clerk indicated roads crossing 
the subject property. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
title company, holding repeatedly that the plaintiff was not on inquiry notice 
because "inquiry notice arises from knowledge of certain facts and circumstances, 
not from records." Id at 838 (emphasis added). The Court further held that 
although the maps were filed with the county clerk, they would not impart 
constructive notice because they were not filed with the county recorder's office. 
The Court stated, "[t]he salutariness of the recording statute is that it provides 
stability and certainty to land titles on which purchasers must rely." Id. at 839. 
In First American Title, the Utah Supreme Court also distinguished a case 
relied upon by the County, Salt Lake. Garfield & West Railway v. Allied Materials 
Co.. 291 P.2d 883 (Utah 1955). In Allied Materials, a railroad company claimed a 
right-of-way over the defendant's land. Although the actual deed was not 
recorded, there was a subsequent deed in the defendant's chain of title that made 
reference to the earlier deed. Moreover, "there were railroad poles, guy wires, and 
this dispute would not exist. Metro West should not be punished for the County's 
complete failure. 
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trolley wires that encroached upon the defendant's land." Id. at 884. On the basis 
of these facts, the Court held that the defendant was on inquiry notice of the 
railway's claim. Id at 886. The Court in First American Title, stated that "Allied 
Materials shows that inquiry notice arises from knowledge of certain facts and 
circumstances [i.e. encroachments and activities on the property], not from 
records:' 996 P.2d at 838 (emphasis added). 
As stated, it is undisputed that there were no activities on Parcel G or 
documents in the Utah County Recorder's Office that were in any way adverse to 
the Tingey's representations to Metro West and certainly no activities or 
documents indicating that the County had any purported interest in Parcel G. 
Metro West was not put on inquiry notice of any adverse claim or interest to Parcel 
G and was under no duty to inquire beyond the property and the Utah County 
Recorder's Office. The simple fact is, if the County had followed Utah law and 
properly recorded its deed, this dispute would not exist. Metro West should not be 
punished and the County rewarded for the County's clear failure. As a bona fide 
purchaser for value, as the party who exclusively used the property and paid all 
taxes on the property for nearly a decade, Metro West is entitled to the protection 
of Utah's Recording Act and is the rightful owner of Parcel G. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON 
THE ALTERNATIVE GROUND THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS 
DEMONSTRATE METRO WEST OBTAINED PARCEL G 
THROUGH ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
Even if this Court were to hold that the trial court incorrectly ruled that 
Metro West is the rightful owner of Parcel G pursuant to Utah's Recording Act, the 
Court should nevertheless uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
Metro West's favor on the alternative ground that Metro West obtained Parcel G 
through adverse possession. In Utah, "[i]t is well-settled that an appellate court 
may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court 
relied on some other ground." DeBrv v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995); see 
also Dipoma v. McPhie. 1 P.3d 564, 566 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (an appellate court 
"may affirm a lower court's ruling on any alternative ground even though that 
ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling") 
(internal quotations omitted). The issue of adverse possession was fully briefed 
and presented to the trial court. As set forth below, Metro West has met the 
statutory elements of adverse possession under Utah law and is the rightful owner 
of Parcel G. 
A. Metro West Has Established the Elements of Adverse Possession. 
Under Utah law, a party who occupies and possesses property under a claim 
of title based on a written instrument for a continuous period of seven years and 
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pays all taxes assessed on the property during that period is deemed to have 
adversely possessed the property. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-8, 12.4 
Section 78-12-9 of the Utah Code states that property is deemed to have 
been possessed where it has been "usually cultivated or improved" or where "it has 
been used" . . . "for the ordinary use of the occupant." The Utah Supreme Court 
has defined "ordinary use of the occupant" as "use appropriate to location and 
character of property." Day v. Steele. 184 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1947). Applying 
this standard, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a defendant obtained adverse 
possession to a parcel of property where it occupied the property by allowing its 
sheep to openly graze "for a period of about three weeks each year" for sufficient 
years under the statute. Cooper v. Carter Oil Co.. 316 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah 1957). 
Metro West has met each of the elements of adverse possession. After 
acquiring Parcel G in 1989, Metro West paid all taxes assessed on the property 
until it sold the property in 1999. [R. at 114-15,145-57.] In 1989, Metro West 
incorporated Parcel G into its adjoining land and thereafter used the entire tract of 
land exclusively as part of Metro West's gravel pit operation. [R. at 108-13,116-
18, 121-26.] At all times, Parcel G was exclusively controlled by Metro West and 
was held out to the public as a part of Metro West's ongoing gravel pit operation. 
4
 A copy of the relevant sections of the Utah Code on adverse possession are 
attached as an Addendum to this brief. 
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[R. at 145-47.] Beginning in 1990 and continuing thereafter, Metro West 
improved Parcel G by bulldozing numerous access roads across the property and 
excavating and drilling numerous holes on Parcel G and conducting regular sample 
testing of the underground materials. [R. at 108-13,116-18,121-26.] 
As set forth above, in response to the fact section in Metro West's Motion 
for Summary Judgment the County failed to set forth a statement of facts it claims 
are in dispute as Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
requires. Accordingly, Metro West's properly supported facts should be deemed 
admitted for purposes of summary judgment and this appeal. Those facts establish 
the statutory elements of adverse possession and make clear that Metro West is the 
rightful owner of Parcel G.5 
B. Parcel G Was Not Designated for Public Use. 
In its opposition to Metro West's Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
County argued that Metro West could not have obtained Parcel G through adverse 
In its opposition memorandum below, the County briefly referenced two 
cases - Day v. Steele, 184 P.2d 216 (Utah 1947) and Riter v. Cayias, 431 P.2d 788 
(Utah 1967) - as apparently analogous cases where Utah courts refused to find 
adverse possession. In both cases, however, the court specifically found that the 
use by the party seeking adverse possession was not exclusive. For example, in 
Day, the court found that third parties regularly stored junk on the property, 
camped on the property, and generally used the property as a right of way such that 
there was no notice that any party was claiming ownership of the property. 184 
P.2d at 219-20. See also Riter, 431 P.2d at 789 (plaintiff failed to show "exclusive 
possession and/or use of the land"). It is undisputed in this case that Metro West 
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possession because Utah law prohibits the adverse possession of public lands. 
Section 78-12-13 of the Utah Code provides that a party may not adversely possess 
government held property that has been "designated for public use." (Emphasis 
added). Because Parcel G was never designated for public use, this exception does 
not apply in this case. 
Section 78-12-13 specifically requires that government owned land sought to 
be exempt from adverse possession be designated for public use. In Pioneer 
Investment & Trust Co. v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City. 99 P. 150 (Utah 
1909), the Court considered whether land previously used for a public school could 
be adversely possessed when the land's use as a public school was discontinued. 
The Court examined this issue under Section 2866x, Comp. Law 1907, which 
closely mirrors the language of Section 78-12-13. See id at 153. The Court held 
that while an exception to adverse possession applies to government entities, "the 
exception only applies to property which is devoted to a special public use." Id. 
The Court further stated that while government entities "may hold real property not 
specifically devoted to public use," they hold such property "in a capacity not 
necessarily governmental" and "[t]o property so held the exception does not 
apply." Id. The Court concluded that since the property was no longer used for a 
continually and exclusively used Parcel G as part of its ongoing gravel pit 
operation. [R. at 108-13,116-18,121-26.] 
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specific public purpose, and had not been for a number of years, the property could 
be adversely possessed. Id. 
The County has not, and cannot, produce any evidence that Parcel G has 
been dedicated to any public use. Indeed, the County's 30(b)(6) witness, Roger 
Hillam, testified that the only thing he could recall regarding the property was that 
in 1998 (after the relevant time period) the County conducted "very" preliminary 
discussions about some type of trail system but that "[n]othing took place." [R. at 
288-291.] Because Parcel G has never been dedicated for public use, section 78-
12-13 simply does not apply. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's decision 
granting summary judgment in Metro West's favor. 
DATED this 3Qr* day of November, 2001. 
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE 
Bv: HU fL rt 
Majk F. James 
Mark R. Clements 
MarkH. Richards 
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Addendum 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-8 
78-12-8. Under written instrument or judgment. 
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, 
entered into possession of the property under claim of title, exclusive of other 
right, founding such claim upon a written instrument as being a conveyance of 
the property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, 
and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the property 
included in such instrument, decree or judgment, or of some part of the 
property under such claim, for seven years, the property so included is deemed 
to have been held adversely, except that when the property so included consists 
of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one lot is not deemed a possession 
of any other lot of the same tract. 
History: L. 1951, 
Supp., 104-12-8. 
Cross-References. 
title, § 57-9-1 et seq. 
ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq. 
— Marketable record 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Commencement of running of statute. 
— Invasion of true owner's rights. 
— Minors. 
Cotenants. 
— Exclusion. 
Exclusiveness of statutory methods. 
"Open" and "continuous" possession. 
— Blacksmith shop. 
Interruption. 
Written instrument. 
- D e e d . 
Description therein. 
Quitclaim deed. 
Tax deed. 
— Mortgage. 
— Sales contract. 
Performance of conditions. 
Commencement of running of statute. 
— Invasion of true owner's rights. 
In action for possession of land, statute of 
limitations does not begin to run until true 
owner's right of possession has been so invaded 
as to give rise to cause of action so that where 
true owner's right to possession of land had not 
been so disturbed or encroached upon, statute 
did not begin to run. Scott v. Hansen, 18 Utah 
2d 303, 422 P.2d 525 (1966). 
— Minors. 
Seven-year period for adverse possession be-
gan to run upon delivery of the so-called guard-
ian's deed executed after the wards attained 
their majority. Memmott v. Bosh, 520 P.2d 1342 
(Utah 1974). 
Cotenants. 
— Exclusion. 
This statute does not run between cotenants 
unless and until there is manifested a determi-
nation on the part of one in possession to 
exclude the other cotenants. Memmott v. Bosh, 
520 R2d 1342 (Utah 1974). 
Exclusiveness of statutory methods. 
Statutory methods of acquiring title by ad-
verse possession, set out in former §§ 104-2-7 
to 104-2-12, were held to be exclusive. Jenkins 
v. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871 (1948). 
"Open" and "continuous" possession. 
— Blacksmith shop. 
Evidence held to show that possession of lot 
by defendant as yard in connection with his 
blacksmith shop was of continuous and open 
character required by statute for title by pos-
session under color of title. Bingham Livery & 
Transf. Co. v. McDonald, 37 Utah 457,110 P. 56 
(1910). 
Interruption. 
Where defendant, in possession of lot used as 
yard in connection with his blacksmith shop, 
permitted teamsters, peddlers, and others who 
had occasion to do so to use it as campground 
when such usage did not interfere with his own 
use and occupation of lot, held, occasional driv-
ing over ground used as yard in going to and 
coming from barn was not interference with, or 
interruption of, defendant's adverse possession. 
Bingham Livery & Transf. Co. v. McDonald, 37 
Utah 457, 110 P. 56 (1910). 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-9 
78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession under writ-
ten instrument. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person 
claiming a title founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree, 
land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases: 
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
(3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel, 
or of fencing timber, for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for 
the ordinary use of the occupant. 
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the 
portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not 
inclosed according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining county 
is deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part 
improved and cultivated. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-9. 
Cross-References. — Agricultural Code, 
Title 4. 
ANALYSIS 
Ancient, unrecorded deed. 
Applicability of section. 
— Easement by prescription. 
Efficacy of section. 
Evidence of adverse possession. 
— Sufficient. 
Exclusiveness of statutory methods. 
Grazing. 
— Grazing season. 
Suitable lands. 
Use part of year. 
— Prima facie case. 
Inclosure or occupancy. 
Invalid tax deed. 
— Actual possession. 
Notice to owner. 
"Ordinary use of the occupant." 
— Holding land for speculation. 
— Not found. 
"Substantial inclosure." 
— Found. 
"Usually cultivated or improved." 
Cited. 
Ancient, unrecorded deed. 
One claiming under ancient deed never re-
corded, and over thirty years' adverse posses-
sion of land, during which improvements were 
made and taxes paid, established title as 
against one claiming under deed from heirs and 
administrator of grantor's estate, but never 
Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq. 
delivered, which was based upon assumption 
that title was still in grantor at time of his 
death, and who paid no taxes, never held pos-
session, and claimed no rights in land until just 
prior to filing suit to quiet title. Perry v. Perry, 
67 Utah 45, 245 P. 695 (1926). 
Applicability of section. 
— Easement by prescription* 
This section does not apply to private rights 
of way or to any other class of easement by 
prescription. It can only be applied by analogy. 
Where a person opens a way for the use of his 
own premises, and another person uses it also 
without causing damage, the presumption is, in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that 
such use by the latter was permissive, and not 
under claim of right. Harkness v. Woodmansee, 
7 Utah 227, 26 R 291 (1891). 
Efficacy of section. 
The statute defining what shall constitute 
adverse possession is of same degree of efficacy 
as is the statute of frauds. Tripp v. Bagley, 74 
Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417 (1928). 
Evidence of adverse possession. 
— Sufficient. 
Where plaintiffs asserted title by written 
instrument and adverse possession, evidence 
that plaintiffs and their predecessors had paid 
all taxes for over thirty years and that the 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
78-12-12 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT, 2d. — 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse 
Possession §§ 28 to 38. 
C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 30 et 
seq. 
A.L.R. — Adverse possession based on en-
croachment of building or other structure, 2 
A.L.R.3d 1005. 
Grazing of livestock or gathering of natural 
crop as fulfilling traditional elements of ad-
verse possession, 48 A.L.R.3d 818. 
Use of property by public as affecting acqui-
sition of title by adverse possession, 56 
A.L.R.3d 1182. 
Key Numbers. — Adverse Possession ®=> 19 
to 21. 
78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid. 
In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the 
provisions of any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land has 
been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and that 
the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have been 
levied and assessed upon such land according to law. 
History: L. 1951, ch- 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-12. 
Compiler's Notes. — This section is identi-
cal to former § 104-2-12 (Code 1943) which was 
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. Section 
104-2-12 was also amended by Laws 1951, ch. 
19, § 1; that provision is compiled as § 78-12-
12.1 herein. The Supreme Court held the 
amendment was valid despite the repeal of 
§ 104-2-12. 
Cross-References. — Marketable record 
title, § 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq. 
Tax sales, § 59-2-1303 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adverse possession. 
Applicability of section. 
Boundary by agreement. 
Boundary dispute. 
Burden of proof. 
Construction. 
Continuous possession. 
Cotenants. 
Evidence. 
Exclusiveness of statutory methods. 
Fence. 
Grantee. 
Life estates. 
Occupation. 
Payment of taxes. 
Pleadings. 
Prescription. 
Public domain. 
Running of statutory time limitation. 
Surface and mining claims. 
Tacking. 
Water. 
Adverse possession. 
Where claimant under claim of ownership 
went into actual possession of certain lots 
commenced to improve them, subsequently re-
ceiving deed from county, held possession was 
adverse, from time of entry, as to all the world 
except county. Welner v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 
120 P. 490, 1914C Ann. Cas. 1175 (1911). 
Open, notorious and hostile use and posses-
sion of the property and payment of taxes 
thereon, all under claim of right, will constitute 
adverse possession. Mansfield v. NefiF, 43 Utah 
258, 134 P. 1160 (1913). 
Where defendant and his predecessors had 
been in actual, open, and adverse possession of 
land for statutory period, and for seven succes-
sive years had paid taxes thereon, and they 
were inclosed, occupied, and cultivated, title 
was acquired by adverse possession. Pacific 
Land & Water Co. v. Hartsough, 50 Utah 581, 
168 P. 552 (1917). 
Applicability of section. 
This section does not apply to rights of way or 
to any other class of easement by prescription. 
It can only be applied by analogy. Harkness v. 
Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291 (1891). 
Where one claiming by adverse possession, 
before seven years necessary for such posses-
sion had run, commenced suit to quiet title 
against one claiming interest in land, held 
T%iain+iflr ranld avail himself of statute as 
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq. 
Tax sales, § 59-2-1303 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Tax title. 
— Claim of right. 
Judgment was properly entered for defen-
dants in a declaratory judgment action to de-
termine rights of parties to realty possessed by 
defendants under tax deed where plaintiffs had 
not been in possession of the realty for more 
than twelve years prior to the bringing of the 
action and had not paid any taxes thereon since 
1932 and defendants held possession under an 
apparent claim of right adversely to plaintiffs 
for more than seven years by grazing sheep 
thereon, the validity of the tax deed being 
immaterial. Cope v. Bountiful Livestock Co., 13 
Utah 2d 20, 368 P.2d 68 (1962). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah's C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 138; 
Short Statutes of Limitation for Tax Titles: The 85 C.J.S. Taxation §§ 984, 985. 
Continuing Specter of Lyman v. National Mart- Key Numbers. — Adverse Possession «=» 
gage Bond Corp. — A Need for Remedial Leg- 79(4); Taxation «=» 805(4). 
islation, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 457. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse 
Possession § 165 et seq. 
78-12-13. Adverse possession of public streets or ways. 
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands held 
by any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated for 
public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or for any 
other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of time 
whatsoever, unless it shall afi&rmatively appear that such town or city or 
county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of, 
and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and 
that for more than seven years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser, 
his grantees or successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous 
and adverse possession of such real estate; in which case an adverse title may 
be acquired. 
History: L- 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-13. 
Cross-References. — Dedication of streets, 
§ 57-5-4. 
Disposal of unused rights of way, § 27-12-97. 
Highways continue until abandoned, § 27-
12-90. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Establishment of a holding by city. 
— Insufficient. 
Establishment of a holding by drainage district. 
Estoppel. 
— Affirmative acts. 
— Denied. 
Establishment of a holding by city. 
— Insufficient* 
The city must have some semblance of title, 
possession or right to use, and making a survey, 
destruction of a fence between the street and 
adjoining property, and verbal assertion of own-
ership by the city are not sufficient to establish 
a holding. Gibbons v. Salt Lake City Corp., 6 
Utah 2d 219, 310 P.2d 513 (1957). 
Establishment of a holding by drainage 
district. 
The evidence indicated that land held by the 
Utah County Drainage District Number 1 was 
for public use and, therefore, could not be 
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